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Abstract 
 
This chapter considers a number of salient themes and contradictory tendencies within 
the politics of tourism in the Mediterranean. Commencing with a brief reflection on 
the integration of the Mediterranean into European orbits of war, conquest and 
colonial rule, it foregrounds the importance of tourism in the uneven spread of 
capitalism throughout the region along with strategies of nationalism and state 
formation.  A salient characteristic of Mediterranean tourism has been the structures 
of patronage and clientage that have persisted and reinforced a ‘rentier’ system of 
accumulation in Mediterranean tourism capitalism whilst enabling family micro-
enterprises to establish a significant foothold in these industries.  The latter part of the 
chapter then considers how the close alignment between tourism and neoliberal 
capitalism has given rise to forms of civic resistance, whilst securitization and the re-
bordering of the region threaten to fundamentally reconfigure the political geography 
of Mediterranean tourism and to disrupt the dense yet fragile ties between tourism and 
the region’s historic cosmopolitanism.  Finally, it explores the role of heritage both as 
a marketable commodity and marker of intra-regional difference, as well as a medium 
through which alternative, critical narratives of tourism and Mediterranean identities 
are emerging 
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Tourism, colonialism, and conflict.  
 
From its earliest times the expansion of travel in the Mediterranean basin 
has either been over shadowed by or indeed been closely implicated in 
acts of war, conquest and colonialism.  Despite John Mason Cook’s 
proclamation that theirs was a ‘business of peace’, both the opening of 
the Suez Canal in 1869, a key strategic asset ever since, followed by 
British imperial subjugation of Egypt by the late 1880s were the platform 
for the expansion of Thomas Cook & Son’s operations further into Egypt 
and throughout the wider Middle East (Brendon 1991: 189).  In North 
Africa, Hussey (2015: 77) notes how during the first bombardments of 
Algiers by French forces during in 1830, well-to-do visitors from French 
high society watched events unfold on board pleasure ships moored off 
shore.  In the wake of the French conquest of Algeria in 1834 tourists 
became increasingly frequent visitors to Algiers while a few accompanied 
military expeditions into the interior commenting upon ‘the savage 
beauty of the countryside and the people’ (Hussey 2015: 105).  Before we 
consign such distasteful forms of entertainment to a time pre-dating 
international human rights and political ethics, more recently, the Israeli 
bombardment of Gaza during ‘Operation Protective Edge’ in 2014, was 
observed from roof-top chairs and sofas by residents of adjacent Israeli 
towns (Mackey 2014).  As Lisle (2007) remarks, the geopolitics of tourist 
gaze is rather more complex and fuzzy than conventional juxtapositions 
of tourism and politics would suggest as evinced by the propensity of 
admittedly, small numbers of tourists, to visit sites of conflict, including 
in the Balkans and Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
 
During the nineteenth century the struggle for territorial control and 
resources to supply the growth of capitalist industry amongst the rising 
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state powers of Europe led to the eventual invasion, annexation and 
integration of the southern and eastern Mediterranean shore into the 
orbits of metropolitan European power.  Whilst this comprised a series of 
militaristic imperial ventures the European penetration of the southern 
shores also gave further impetus to manifold economic, social and 
cultural connections between northern and southern Mediterranean shores 
that were to mark the cross-fertilization of identities and language across 
the region as well as shape intra-Mediterranean movements of people 
(Tarrius 2002).  More significantly, in terms of the representational 
politics and the trans-Mediterranean architecture of travel that was to 
follow, the rise of belligerent nationalisms of the late nineteenth century 
and the world wars of the first half of the twentieth century was to disrupt 
and suppress the historic cosmopolitanism of Mediterranean ports and 
cities.  Increasingly, Mediterranean societies became absorbed into the 
territorial containers of emerging nation-states and their ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and confessional fluidity and heterogeneity variously absorbed 
into post-colonial narratives of nationalism and economic modernization, 
albeit expressed in varying politico-cultural idioms (see Hourani 2005: 
308-310). 
 
Although the arrival of Thomas Cook signalled the end of privilege and 
with it the expansion of travel throughout the Mediterranean for emerging 
north European middle classes from the late nineteenth onwards, he was 
merely following in the footsteps of earlier pilgrimage flows from Europe 
to the Middle East.  Moreover, it was the French company Club 
Méditerranée that was to revolutionize the mass package holiday model 
and launch it as a key driver of capital accumulation throughout the 
Mediterranean and beyond after the Second World War.  Founded in 
Paris in 1950 by two veterans of the French and Belgian resistance, Club 
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Méditerranée in fact started as a non-profit organization before it later 
evolved into the billion dollar Chinese-owned multinational corporation it 
is today.   While states played a significant role in the financing and 
operation of tourism facilities in post-war Mediterranean economies, 
Club Méditerranée provided the launching pad for a model of affordable 
tourism for a generation scarred by war without the need to for 
government assistance, built around a network of low cost vacation 
villages (Furlough 2009: 175).   
 
The Mediterranean has long served as a byword for hedonism, pleasure 
and sensuous delights while simultaneously being home to some of the 
most conflictual and unequal regions in the world.  Moreover, nowhere 
else on earth, perhaps the US-Mexico border notwithstanding, does the 
wealth and power of the advanced industrialized world press up quite so 
closely and at times, aggressively, against the impoverished South, as so 
starkly demonstrated by the current large-scale movements of refugees 
northwards through the region.  Nevertheless, the pull of its ancient 
archaeological sites, pilgrimage centres and historic towns and myriad 
cultural events and festivals, and more recently, its islands, beaches and 
glitzy resorts has provided the bedrock upon which many Mediterranean 
states particularly on the north shore, have engineered a transition to 
modern capitalist economies albeit with varying degrees of success.  This 
has provided a livelihood for literally dozens of businesses and trades 
encompassing long-standing local merchant families, foreign ‘lifestyle’ 
entrepreneurs, migrants from Africa, South Asia and the Middle East 
selling cheaply produced wares on the beaches, to the larger-scale 
capitalist enterprises and foreign corporations that have frequently 
absorbed the lion’s share of tourism revenues in the major mass beach 
destinations across the Mediterranean basin. 
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In terms of their macro-economic standing there is a significant gulf in 
both the levels of economic development as well as the volume of tourist 
arrivals that continues to divide Mediterranean Europe from its 
counterparts on the southern and eastern shores where per capita incomes 
are on average around half or less than the north shore with the exception 
of Cyprus and Israel (see UNWTO 2016). In addition to the problems of 
chronic unemployment, poverty and indebtedness southern 
Mediterranean states also face mounting challenges associated with 
population growth.  While in 1985 the approximately 350 million 
inhabitants of the Mediterranean basin were distributed relatively evenly 
between north and south by 2025 the southern shore will account for two-
thirds of the expected 600 million inhabitants that will reside in the 
region (Buades 2014: 22). The distribution of tourist arrivals  across the 
Mediterranean basin is also highly uneven, ranging from 68 million 
arrivals in Spain, the world’s third highest recipient, and nearly 40 
million in Turkey, to figures that are considerably lower in areas of the 
war torn east of the region. And as for Turkey, situated at the cross-roads 
of Europe and the Middle East in more than mere geographical sense, its 
historically high volume of tourists has clearly been reduced since the 
arrival to its south of Daesh/Isis, the refugee crisis, and other features of 
political instability. There are significant regional variations too in the 
competitiveness of the tourism sectors, as measured by the World Travel 
and Tourism Competitiveness Index, currently topped by Spain (WEF 
2015).  
 
At a conservative estimate given the unreliability of national statistics, the 
Mediterranean region receives approximately 250 million international 
tourists each year.  Three-quarters of these arrivals are concentrated in 
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just five countries (in order of importance: Spain, France, Italy, Turkey 
and Croatia) not all of which can be strictly speaking considered as part 
of the Mediterranean basin given their substantial touristic offer in the 
hinterland.  Given such volumes, which of course does not account for 
the considerable movements of domestic tourists, as well as the various 
other, often over-lapping flows of labour migration and refugee 
movements, it is perhaps unsurprising that the political dimension of 
tourism has been ignored in favour of an emphasis on tourism’s economic 
and development potential.  
 
Tourism and the building of states and nations 
 
During the period of European colonial rule, travel to the Middle East 
was predominantly framed by Orientalist discourses through which 
travelers imagined themselves witness to a cultural landscape that 
remained essentially unchanged since Biblical times (Daher 2007: 7). But 
throughout the Mediterranean processes of state formation in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries became intertwined with periods 
of autocratic rule and the embrace of economic liberalism, often at the 
same time.  Additionally, there was widespread adoption of tourism both 
as source of economic growth, contributor to political legitimacy, and the 
construction of more or less uniform narratives of the normalcy of the 
‘nation’. Indeed tourism was embraced as an instrument of nationalist 
propaganda in several Mediterranean states for the purposes of 
constructing and projecting a particular image of the ‘nation’ both 
outwards as well as inwards towards the domestic populations, 
particularly where strong regional and sub-national identities were seen 
by central government as ‘problematic’, as in Spain. During the 
dictatorial rule of Metaxas (1936-1941), for example, Greece embraced 
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the potential of tourism as an instrument of nationalist propaganda and in 
so doing celebrated Greece’s plethora of ancient sites, monuments and 
national costumes as emblematic of the (young) nation’s ‘eternal national 
glory’ (Dritsas 2009: 52).   In Spain, although initial steps to promote 
tourism had already commenced at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, after the Second World War the authoritarian regime led by 
General Franco (1939-1975) saw tourism as means to bolster a 
reinvigorated patriotic nationalism, less tainted by the legacy of the Civil 
War (1936-1939) and as a means through which to ‘siphon political 
capital from the putative market value of Spanish national identity’ 
(Crumbaugh 2006: 11).  Modern mass tourism thus became, as indeed it 
did elsewhere in the Mediterranean, a powerful symbolic cultural setting 
in which authoritarian regimes and state technocrats sought to define and 
remake the image of the nation and to integrate their economies into the 
wider circulation of capital. 
 
Examples of the power of tourism related discourse to shape nationalist 
sentiments are readily to be found throughout the region, particularly 
clearly in Cyprus and Israel/Palestine. Thus, for example, in her 
examination of the Canbulet museum in Famagusta, Scott (2002) has 
shown the ways in which narratives about the Turks as enemies and 
potential colonial occupiers of Cyprus in the Ottoman period, have 
become transformed since the Turkish military intervention in the island 
in 1974, into stories and cartographic representations of the Turkish 
nation as saviour of the Turkish speaking part of the island’s population. 
In the Israeli case Selwyn (1996) has shown how tours for both internal 
and external tourists organized by the Society of Protection of Nature in 
Israel (SPNI) are specifically designed to inculcate amongst its followers 
feelings of deep connection between the landscape and the Israeli nation. 
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By contrast the tours organized by institutions such as the Alternative 
Tourism Group (ATG) and the Jerusalem Tourism Cluster (JTC) are 
composed quite specifically to draw out version of the symbolism of 
landscape that stresses cosmopolitan nature of Jerusalem and the region 
more generally. Whilst this chapter was being written an initiative was 
announced by the (Israeli) Kfar Etzion field school to map out a hiking 
trail in what the Israeli authorities term “Judea and Samaria”, that is the 
occupied Palestinain territories, to supplement Israel’s National Trail, 
which runs inside the country’s internationally recognized frontiers. The 
SPNI has confirmed that it will consider how to support this so-called 
“Eastern Trail. 
 
 Tourism, uneven regional development and spread of capitalism  
 
Prior to the emergence of the modern Egyptian state (1953) and the 
creation of the ‘post-mandate’ states of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and 
the Palestinian Territories, travel to such ancient archaeological sites as 
Palmyra, Baalbek and Ephesus, as well as pilgrimage centres such as 
Bethlehem and Jerusalem in the eastern Mediterranean and the great 
cosmopolitan towns and cities of Aleppo, Alexandria, and Constantinople 
was already well established.  In both Greece and Turkey, the inter-war 
period saw attempts by their respective authoritarian and statist regimes 
to stimulate the development of hotels and tourist activity focusing in the 
main on ancient archaeological sites. Nevertheless, tourist numbers 
remained low and the infrastructure inadequate. It was only after the 
Second World War, following unsuccessful attempts by modernizing 
elites across the region to establish competitive industrial sectors during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that Spain, Greece, 
Turkey and Tunisia in particular began to look to mass beach tourism in 
9 
 
order to compensate for weak and uncompetitive industrial sectors and as 
an effective short-cut to economic modernization.  In Tunisia, a country 
whose only other major export at the time of independence was 
phosphates, President Bourguiba (1956-1987) mobilized the resources of 
the newly independent state to drive economic modernization and 
integrate Tunisia into the post-war world economy.  Hazbun (2008: 6) 
recounts how, in addition to an instrument of economic development, 
tourism was perceived as a demonstration of Tunisia’s commitment to 
‘modernity’ and ‘openness’. 
 
The precipitous post-war expansion of tourism within the Mediterranean 
region was not simply an outcome of the timely intersection between 
rising disposable incomes in the industrialized capitalist states of the 
north and ‘enlightened’ endogenous statist interventionism in the south.  
In the cases of Greece and Spain, the influence of the United States was 
felt in the form of substantial inflows of foreign aid and private capital 
channelled into the construction of tourist facilities. Between 1968 and 
1970 over fifty per cent of all foreign investment in tourism was US 
capital (Leontidou 1998: 106). Since the war, US tutelage of post-war 
Greece was strongly motivated by a fear of the Communist ‘threat’, one 
that had been shared by Churchill. Despite the illiberal nature of Franco’s 
regime,  Spain too was the recipient of US loans and was critical to the 
post-war balance of power in the Mediterranean given its strategic 
location at the cross-roads of the Atlantic, Europe and North Africa 
(Crumbaugh 2009: 24; Pi-Sunyer 1979: 58).   
 
In the Eastern Mediterranean, the waning influence of the European 
colonial powers was supplanted by the growing influence of the United 
States in the post-war politico-economic order in the Middle East.  United 
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States government backing for the expansion of international US hotel 
consortia and its major commercial airlines into the Mediterranean and 
beyond – Pan American Airways and TW - was integral to the emergence 
of Beirut and Cairo as regional transit hubs (Hazbun 2015).  More 
importantly, as Hazbun notes, the closure of Israeli airspace to Arab 
carriers after 1948 followed by Nasser’s programme of nationalization in 
Egypt after 1953, in conjunction with US backing for Lebanon’s Middle 
East Airlines (MEA), were key factors helping to establish Beirut as a 
cosmopolitan centre of tourism and commerce in the 1950s and 1960s 
before this was overshadowed by the rise of international air piracy and 
the Lebanese civil war in the mid-1970s.  
 
The impressive rates of growth and annual increases in per capita income 
experienced in the major mass beach destinations of Spain, Greece, 
Turkey and Tunisia during the 1960s and early 1970s is often seen as 
evidence of mass tourism’s profound capacity to bring about 
‘transformative economic development in southern European and 
Mediterranean states, in the absence of viable economic alternatives 
(Butcher 2003: 24) In addition it has also been argued that tourism laid 
the foundations for the dissolving of existing social hierarchies and was a 
catalyst for democratization of Mediterranean societies (Pack 2006: 191-
5). Yet, not only has tourism prospered alongside authoritarian regimes in 
Egypt, Greece, Tunisia and Turkey, Crumbaugh (2009) and Pack (2009) 
have both documented how Spain’s transformation  from statist autarky 
and dictatorship to a modern capitalist economy was part of an explicit 
state-managed programme of economic liberalization designed to 
enhance the political legitimacy of Franco’s dictatorial regime and 
smooth Spain’s peaceful integration into the international liberal order of 
‘democratic’ states.  Rather than herald the disintegration of the regime 
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the ‘iron fist of the Franco dictatorship was usually well hidden from 
tourists’ (Löfgren 1999: 174).  The democratic deficit associated with the 
centralised direction of tourism was keenly felt in Catalonia, where 
hostility to tourism amongst Catalan regionalist parties was premised on 
precisely Franco’s support for tourism as well as the regime’s attempt to 
annihilate all traces of regional cultural-linguistic difference (Pi-Sunyer 
1977). 
 
By the early 1980s, despite the transition to democracy in Spain and 
Greece, and the electoral victory of modernizing social democratic parties 
in both countries there was a remarkable ideological consistency with 
regard to the state’s attitude towards the promotion of tourism. This 
period was concomitant with the accession of Greece and Spain, along 
with Portugal, to the European Community and the deepening integration 
of Mediterranean states into global capitalism and the intensification of 
tourism as instrument of capital accumulaion.  Although the 1970s 
witnessed increased social unrest and the transition to democratic rule 
across the European Mediterranean, the consistency with which tourism 
has been promoted by all political parties has hardened as indeed have 
attempts to foreclose popular critiques of tourism and its increasingly 
problematic consequences.  
 
By the 1970s the shortcomings of the state-led development of tourism in 
the southern Mediterranean were becoming all too apparent. The failure 
to upgrade ageing hotels and resort stock together with the growing 
influence of integrated, transnational tour operators whose ability to 
amalgamate suppliers across different countries and enabling them to 
squeeze profit margins, precipitated a transition towards a greater role for 
markets and private enterprise in the political economy of Mediterranean 
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tourism.  In Egypt and Tunisia policies of infitah or economic 
liberalization were implemented within a year of each other in 1970 and 
1971 (Hazbun 2008: 11; Steiner 2008: 947). The principal effect was to 
increase the volume of private capital (domestic and foreign) investment 
channelled into the development of integrated luxury resort enclaves in 
previously undeveloped coastal locations.   The onset of the oil crisis in 
1973-74 triggered a downturn in tourism as arrivals and receipts 
momentarily fell (offset by increased oil revenues and remittances from 
workers in the Gulf).  The aftermath of the energy crisis was marked by 
two further factors of significance – the recycling of ‘petro-dollars’ into 
luxury real estate and resort developments in Tunisia (Hazbun 2008: 28), 
and the opening up the Sinai - Red Sea coast to tourism investments as a 
result of the cessation of hostilities between Egypt and Israel (Richter and 
Steiner 2008). Significantly, however, state policies of privatization and 
economic liberalization not only provided a much needed boost in 
tourism revenues, throughout the region, autocratic Arab states have been  
sought to embrace globalization and stabilize their economies through 
tourism while simultaneously ensuring that the ‘neo-patrimonial structure 
of power’ remains unchallenged (Steiner 2006).  
 
Despite the important role played by developmental states and the 
prevalence of autocratic governments along the southern Mediterranean 
shore, top-down policies of tourism development have always co-existed 
alongside spontaneous and unregulated private initiative.  Despite what 
often appears to be an emphasis on large-scale tourism capital and 
international consortia in many parts of the Mediterranean, in reality there 
is great deal of variability and a diversity of ownership arrangements in 
which the vast majority of hotel/tourism firms are made up of small, 
family-run businesses and informal traders.  
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Class, liberal democracy, and persistence of patron/client networks  
 
In both the eastern Mediterranean, as well as Greece and Spain, wealthy 
families, networks of kin, prominent expatriate capitalists (including elite 
shipping and oligarchic-dynastic families in the Greek case, landed 
bourgeoisie in the Spanish case) and/or rich expatriate capitalists (often 
linked closely with one or both of the above familial categories) have 
been involved in the financing and running of iconic luxury hotels and 
other tourism businesses from an early period (Daher 2007: 25). In Spain, 
two of the most powerful transnational hotel and resort corporations 
originating in the Balearic Islands, Barceló and Riu, grew to prominence 
as a result of close links that were cultivated between their owners and 
the Franco regime in the 1950s (Buades 2009 28-39).  In Lebanon, a 
country that is heavily dependent on tourism and trade, a ‘Consortium’ of 
thirty oligarchic families with business interests spanning finance, 
industry, construction, transport import-export agencies and public sector 
contracts came to prominence in the late 1940s and 1950s and controlled 
a range of tourism assets including the iconic St George’s and Bristol 
Hotels as well as Air Liban and MEA (Traboulsi 2012: 116-7).    
 
However, a salient feature of a number of many such dynastic families is 
their commitment to philanthropic causes. While the Barceló family have 
close ties to the Catholic order of Opus Dei, Daher (2007:  19-20) notes 
how a number of elite/notable families in the Middle East have supported 
a range of philanthropic ventures, financing heritage conservation and 
museums dedicated to the preservation of local cultural traditions, 
including the Saida Soap Museum and Bsous Silk Museum in Lebanon. 
Capitalism (as it exists within the tourism and hospitality spheres) in parts 
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of the Mediterranean is thus not so much a coherent system of economic 
and political relations (as it is claimed to be in western/northern states) 
but more one aspect of uneven systems of relations interlaced with 
principles of patronage and clientage.  
 
The transition to democracy experienced by the tourism-dependent 
economies on the north shore and the transformation of deficit-led state-
run economies into liberal capitalist ones did little to uproot entrenched 
systems of patronage and clientelist practices.   Rather than bring about 
far-reaching democratic political institutionalization they merely adapted 
and reconfigured the state to their own needs co-opting key interest 
groups and upwardly mobile fractions of the bourgeoisie into their 
networks of patronage and influence (Kurth 1993: 53). Despite concerted 
attempts by newly elected social democratic parties in Greece and Spain 
to introduce measures to constrain excessive urban expansion and 
reconfigure tourism towards a more sustainable model with more 
equitable distributive outcomes, resistance to the imposition of land use 
and conservation planning measures remained strong amongst both the 
rent-seeking bourgeoisie as well as emergent class of small entrepreneurs 
(Briassoulis 2003: 106).  In Greece, the electoral victory of PASOK in 
1981 promised a radical restructuring of the economy towards those who 
had been excluded for the economic gains of the past but in fact, the 
emphasis on small to medium-sized tourism enterprises resulted in the 
indiscriminate expansion of urban construction and unregistered 
accommodation as small-scale entrepreneurs sought to cultivate ties with 
local party officials in order to access to state funds, much of which was 
then channeled into speculative real-estate investments (Petras et al. 
1993: 182).    
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In Spain, where the transition to democracy was more associated with a 
more forceful implementation of neoliberal economic reforms the result 
was nevertheless not dissimilar.  In this case the closure of protected state 
industries and rise in unemployment was followed by the precipitous 
expansion of finance, construction, real estate and low-wage/low 
productivity tourism services throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s.  
Particularly in those regions where tourism is predominant share of the 
economy (Andalusia, Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Catalonia, 
Valencian Region) an upwardly-mobile rent-seeking urban/landed 
bourgeoisie colluded with public authorities, fueling the spectacular 
growth of untrammeled, speculative real estate-tourism developments 
throughout the nineties and into the twenty first century (López and 
Rodríguez 2011: 17).  
 
As numerous ethnographic studies have shown the arrival of mass 
tourism in the Greek Islands, in a process also witnessed in parts of rural 
Spain, Portugal and southern Italy, helped to precipitate the transition 
from agrarian to capitalist societies during the 1950s and 1960s  (eg., 
Kousis 1989; Stott 1973; Zarkia 1996).  The rapid insertion of tourism 
into these societies paved the way for upward social mobility and the 
emergence of new strata of small-scale entrepreneurs from amongst the 
peasant and fisher communities, as well as returnee migrants from the 
mainland in the case of the Aegean islands (Kenna 1993), who opened 
and operated a large number of small to medium-sized tourist enterprises. 
Futhermore, a small but upwardly mobile  class of capitalist 
entrepreneurs grew out of what often began as small tourism  businesses 
that later grew into large domestic consortia which were highly 
influential in the political sphere such as the Grecotel-Daskalontakis and 
Sani Groups in Greece (Dritsas 2009: 64).  
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Despite the rapid economic modernization and undoubted improvements 
in living standards and state revenues brought about by the considerable 
scope and scale of tourism development across the region since the 
1950s, tourism has intensified rather than weakened many of the 
structural deficiencies of Mediterranean political economy (see Charnock 
et al. 2014: 48-49).  In the absence of industrialization tourism has 
accentuated the flow of investments into easier and more profitable 
avenues, including construction and real estate, and thus intensified 
speculative over productive investments. In what are often described as 
‘rentier’ or indeed ‘semi-rentier’ systems (Steiner 2006: 171), the 
accumulation of capital is generated predominantly through exploitation 
of access to land and other strategic resources (eg., raw materials, leases, 
remittances and aid transfers) or else the manipulation of tightly 
controlled markets (monopolies) at the expense of productive investments 
in enterprise, innovation and improved labour productivity (Richter and 
Steiner 2008: 942-3).  Where tourism is a strong feature of local 
economies, profits are mainly generated by capturing rents from the 
anticipated future returns on strategically placed land and other property 
assets. 
 
Such rentier systems of accumulation have been prevalent throughout the 
Mediterranean since the nineteenth century (Sapelli 1995: 66-7).  
However, the role of tourism has often played an important part in 
accentuating its predominance, both in authoritarian states as well as in 
those states that have experienced a transition from oligarchic and 
authoritarian rule to various forms of parliamentary democracy. In the 
absence of industrialization tourism has often been a major force of 
urbanization, especially so where mass beach tourism is predominant.  In 
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so doing it has helped to shape the class character of those regions, as 
noted earlier in relation to entrepreneurship. Families that migrated to 
large-scale resort areas for work often maintained a foothold in agrarian 
economies thereby reinforcing the continuity of family-based networks of 
patronage and clientelism inhibiting the affirmation of democratic 
political values characteristic of mass-industrial societies (see Bianchi 
and Santana 2004).   
 
Heritage marketing and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
 
So far we have identified a number of economic and political factors and 
processes (including the uneven path of capitalist development, the 
continuing salience of patron/client relations, the imperfect passage to 
democratic governance) that, taken together, help us understand an 
initiative of considerable politico-economic importance undertaken by the 
European Parliament and Commission in 1995. The so-called “Barcelona 
Process” launched in that year consisted of complex strategic agreements 
between the EU and Mediterranean states. EC Spokespersons explained 
that the main purpose of the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” set up in 
Barcelona was to further the efficacy of the “market” in the region thus 
raising the economic level of those countries, including Greece, which 
had joined the EU 1981, Spain/ Portugal (acceded in 1986) and the 
partner states on the Mediterranean’s southern shore (cf CEC, 2002, 13). 
The EMP would thus not only raise living standards and spread 
democracy (or both) but, by so doing, also make a substantial 
contribution to greater security in the EU itself. But the EMP was also 
important for strategies and agreements having to do with education, 
cultural heritage, and (thus) tourism.  
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The Barcelona Process thus combined and interwove politico-economic 
designs with cultural ones. “Culture” thus came to be subsumed within 
the overall scheme. What is now referred to as “cultural heritage” was 
brought into the market place – to be bought and sold like other products. 
A number of EC research and development programmes of work by 
academic partnerships of universities and research centres in Europe and 
partner Mediterranean states were undertaken to demonstrate the 
fundamental cultural unity of the region. These programmes were 
underpinned by a dual and contradictory set of philosophical and 
historical principles. On the one had they reflected, as we have implied in 
various ways above, a certain cultural unity in the region that had existed 
for millennia. On the other hand they were part of a wider EU based 
project to impose neoliberal restructuring on southern Mediterranean 
states. The main aim, according to the EC, of the EMP was, and remains, 
to enhance competitiveness and stimulate economic development in the 
Mediterranean region and to integrate the southern shore further into 
orbits of European capital accumulation – remaking Mediterranean cities 
and neighbourhoods into suitable avenues of profitable accumulation for 
mobile transnational capital. 
 
This is the background under which urban spaces and historic sites across 
the Mediterranean are being converted into ensembles of attractions and 
commodities to be consumed by a growing market of high-spending 
cultural tourists – a process accentuated in the case of ‘flagship’ heritage 
development projects orchestrated and financed by international donor 
agencies – further dismantling the dense social mix/socioeconomic 
diversity of such communities and disrupting long-standing ties between 
diverse resident communities and the urban fabric of historic 
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Mediterranean quarters and ‘heritage’ sites as they are integrated into a 
globalised commodity economy for tourism (see Daher 2007: 27-41).  
 
Tourism, refugees and regional re-bordering  
 
Despite the rich legacy of antiquity, the abundance of archaeological 
ruins and cultural heritage across North Africa and the Middle East, the 
imbalance in the volume of tourist arrivals and distribution of revenues 
from tourism between the northern and southern shores, can partly be 
attributed the region’s ‘fragmented geopolitics’ (Hazbun 2008: xxxix).  
 
Thus, to point to one historical moment as an example, there was a brief 
window of geopolitical stability in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989 and the peace agreements between Israel, Jordan and Egypt as 
well as the Oslo Accords of 1994. But by the end of the twentieth 
century, after a period of more or less uninterrupted expansion of mass 
travel, terrorist bombings and violent civil conflicts disrupted the eastern 
Mediterranean tourist trade and threatened to reconfigure the political and 
economic geography of contemporary Mediterranean tourism. Direct and 
indirect attacks on civilian targets and sites of cultural significance 
resulted in a reduction of tourist numbers in parts of the region as a result 
of perceptions of risk and insecurity. The most dramatic collapse has of 
course been experienced by Syria, whose numbers and revenues have all 
but disappeared after reaching a high of 8.5 million arrivals and US$6.2 
billion in tourism receipts in 2010 (UNWTO 2016). The origins and 
motives of the attackers quite diverse despite most being attributed to 
‘militant Islamic’ groups, although it is important to bear in mind that 
violent attacks on tourism installations that have also been perpetrated by 
more ‘conventional’ separatist movements, ETA (Spain) and the PKK 
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(Turkey). In addition, southern European resorts are not immune from the 
violence associated with the spread of global terrorism as the 2016 
‘Bastille Day’ attack by a disaffected youth from the banlieux of Nice 
demonstrated. 
  
Events of these kinds have seen the Mediterranean increasingly 
transformed into a militarised frontier between the impoverished migrants 
and persecuted refugees from the global South seeking refuge in Europe, 
and those fully entitled to ‘the collective fiction of universal rights’ that 
comes from being a European citizen, including the right to the freedom 
of movement and travel, and those who are not (Calori 2015).   
 
The terrorizing of tourists and tourism spaces and concomitant 
securitization of travel and border politics is underpinned by a discursive 
framing of the ‘tourist’ in contra-distinction to ‘migrants’, ‘refugees’, and 
‘terrorists’ (often seen as interchangeable categories) further reinforcing 
tangible economic cleavages and forms of political exclusion that define 
and shape the militarism and securitization of Europe/European resorts. 
Border fences have been erected Bulgaria, Hungary and Macedonia. The 
EU has made an agreement with Turkey to detain refugees in exchange 
for visa-free travel and a payment of €6 billion. The EU has also 
instructed Greece, a country already buffeted by years of economic crisis 
exacerbated by EU/troika-mandated austerity, to contain refugees within 
its borders. The re-territorialization of state power and concomitant re-
bordering of the Mediterranean, together with EU political backing for 
the violation of one of the most fundamental codes of maritime conduct – 
the obligation to assist those in peril at sea - threatens to rupture long-
standing ties of culture, exchange, and trade between peoples along the 
Mediterranean shore and to further atomise and fracture the tentative 
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unity and open-ness upon which decades of mass travel throughout the 
Mediterranean basin have depended.  
 
Despite the many atrocities that seek to turn local communities against 
tourists, there have also been notable demonstrations of bravery shown 
towards tourists during such attacks (eg. see Stephen 2015), as well as 
touching acts of compassion and solidarity between locals & tourists in 
the aftermath of the violence. Although thousands of tourists left in the 
immediate aftermath of a fatal terrorist attack on the Tunisian resort of 
Sousse in June 2015, which left 38 people dead (30 of whom were 
tourists) there have been notable acts of defiance and solidarity shown 
towards Tunisian hosts (Marlowe 2015). In addition, neighbouring 
Algeria, a country that has experienced its fair share of political violence, 
expressed its full solidarity with Tunisia and promised to launch a 
solidarity campaign to boost the already substantial flow of Algerian 
tourists to Tunisia (Traboulsi 2015). 
 
Additionally, despite the often hostile and xenophobic reactions displayed 
towards refugees by populist nationalists throughout Europe and in some 
sections of the media, residents on the Greek Island of Kos and a number 
of visitors and tourists have rallied to lend humanitarian assistance to as 
many of the hundreds of thousands of refugees who’ve arrived on the 
island since the summer of 2015. One resident stated: ‘This is hospitality. 
People with nothing understand more than people who have everything’, 
alluding to the collective memory of past hardship and the more recent 
experiences of struggle related to the Eurozone crisis (cited in McVeigh 
2015).  
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Tourism as resistance 
 
The above paragraphs lead us into our penultimate section. Our direction 
of travel so far in the chapter has stressed the extent to which tourism has 
been incorporated into the broader global and regional project of bringing 
the Mediterranean region further into the orbit of organised capitalism, 
the free market, and ideological and symbolic emphases on the centrality 
of state and nation (rather than images and ideas that stressed cultural 
unities within a cosmopolitan region). As we have pointed out this has 
involved the simultaneous marketisation and nationalisation of cities and 
tourist related heritage sites. Moving towards a conclusion we return to  
observations we have made earlier about those tourism initiatives that are 
self consciously critical of the ways in which tourism has used in this 
way.  
 
To start with there have been diverse forms of civil society resistance 
against speculative real estate and excessive tourism developments (Cavo 
Sdero in Greece, Nivica in Albania, Save Beirut Heritage in Lebanon, for 
example).  On the island of Malta, since the early days of tourism 
development the focus of environmental protests has shifted from 
concerns to do with the protection of flora and fauna from excessive 
urban development to social justice and the democratic use and 
organisation of space (Boissevain (2004). More recently a wave of anti-
austerity movements (eg. Indignados, Spain) arising in the wake of the 
Eurozone crisis, have engaged in increasingly direct and forceful acts of 
resistance against speculative real estate-driven tourism.  In Barcelona, 
the radical new mayor and former anti-eviction activist, Ada Colau, has 
galvanised local neighbourhood groups and activists in the former 
working class neighbourhood of Barceloneta, and has offered support and 
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solidarity to what have become increasingly frequent protests targeted at 
the US-based on-line booking agency, Air B’n’B.  
 
There are other examples of tourist related movements of resistance to 
tourist related developments. The political and legal actions of those 
groups opposed to the Hilton project in Malta described by Boissevain 
(2004) may be compared to the activities of the Mallorca based institution 
Arca which has led demonstrations against the eviction of poor (and often 
gypsy) residents in the centre of Ciutat de Mallorca at the same time as 
celebrating the extent to which this capital city has been shaped by its 
mixture of Christian, Arab, and Jewish residents.  
 
In Palestine the success of such groups as ATG and JTC (see above) has 
been powerfully (and equally successfully) complemented by such Israeli 
groups as Zochrot and Emek Shaveh, the former running tours to 
destroyed Palestinian villages in Israel, the latter taking tours to the 
disputed neighbourhood in Jerusalem of Silwan with the aim of 
challenging the idea, put forward by the Israeli authorities, that this 
largely Palestinian neighbourhood was, and should be seen to be part of 
the (Jewish) “City of David”.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The geographical placing of the Mediterranean involves taking both a 
regional and a global view. The former suggests that the Mediterranean 
may be defined in relation to the sea itself whilst the latter takes the 
global passage through the region of traders, pilgrims, diplomats, 
refugees, tourists, and others, as evidence that the region is pre-eminently 
a central part of a much wider world. 
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Mindful of the above, and noting that the politics of tourism in the 
Mediterranean have been relatively under studied, this chapter has 
suggested that there are several good and interconnected reasons for 
pursuing the topic. We have thus pointed up the extent to which tourism 
and the main political and politico-economic currents in the region have 
been interwoven since the early days. We have described how tourism 
has been put to use in the interests of spreading capitalism as well as to 
the advancement and promotion of ideas and practices having to do with 
state and nation being foundational principles of social and cultural 
solidarity. But we have also noted the use to which operators of 
‘alternative’ tours have been using tourism to resist these notions in the 
name of regionalism and cosmopolitanism. We have described the 
‘unevenness’ of tourist related capitalist development, pointed out that 
patron/client relations continue to cut across emergent class structures, 
and that the economic gap between the north and south of the region 
continues to widen. One implication here is that any attempt to explain 
violent attacks on northern tourists in the south would need to start from 
such regional economic inequality as well as the complex political 
fissures that cross-cut the region. 
 
We have argued that these political, economic, and politico-economic 
features necessarily form backgrounds to explanations and explorations 
about of the place of  “cultural heritage” in the region. Thus we have 
identified contradictory tendencies. Whilst mainstream tour operations 
(typically flowing from private sector initiatives aided and supported by 
national and international government) sell commodified versions of 
heritage to tourists and international media, alternative versions 
(sometimes involving different sites and spaces) of heritage are being 
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used to construct more critical narratives. We identified some of the 
many issues raised by the deployment of tourism related cultural heritage, 
particularly questions about who decides what heritage to display to 
whom – in other words, about the nature of the political and institutional 
processes engaged in the heritage project.  
 
We may conclude by framing the Mediterranean in terms of the 
contradictory social facts of cosmopolitanism and multi-cultural 
coexistence, on the one hand, and narratives about the primacy of ‘ethnic’ 
and/or ‘national’ identity, on the other. The question that arises for 
students of politics of Mediterranean tourism concerns the relationship 
between these alternative social and cultural orders and a cultural heritage 
shaped increasingly (and increasingly uniformly) by an emboldened 
market economy and the febrile politics to which it is bound.   
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